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LAW AND INFORMATION PLATFORMS
PHILIP J. WEISER*
INTRODUCTION
This symposium presents an ideal "platform" to support the
launch of a new journal focused on telecommunications and high
technology law. Unlike more established areas of the law, the
field of telecommunications or, as more aptly termed, informa-
tion law, is not easily defined. To be sure, there is an ambitious
statutory code (the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,
most notably by the Telecommunications Act of 19961) and an
agency charged with administering it (the Federal Communica-
tions Commission). There is even a leading casebook for teach-
ing "Telecommunications Law."2  But as the history of
telecommunications makes clear, legal regulation of this indus-
try defies easy categorization, as it strays across legal spheres-
into antitrust, intellectual property, and First Amendment law-
as well as into non-legal disciplines-into principles of engineer-
ing and economics, for example.
With the rise of the Internet and recent advances in informa-
tion technology, businesses, lawyers, and scholars have focused
on how to create and implement a new regulatory regime pre-
mised on competition and technological convergence. 3 Over time,
this new regime will begin to transform telecommunications reg-
ulation into a particularized form of antitrust; that is, rather
than follow its traditional role of addressing market power con-
cerns directly, telecommunications regulation will increasingly
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law and Department
of Interdisciplinary Telecommunications. Thanks to Ken Bamberger, Dale Hatfield,
Jon Nuechterlein, Daniel Ravicher, Marius Schwartz, Jim Speta and Molly van
Houweling for helpful comments and encouragement.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. See STUART M. BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY
(2001).
3. For a description of the substance of this model, see Joseph D. Kearney &
Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (1998). For a description of the procedural framework
for this model, see Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecom-
munications Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1999); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Com-
mon Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1736-46 (2001).
2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW [Vol. 1
focus on addressing these concernts indirectly by facilitating com-
petition wherever possible. 4 Moreover, because technological
convergence-i.e., the provision of identical services through dif-
ferent technologies-will continue to blur the boundaries be-
tween the various segments of the information industries-
telecommunications, computing, and entertainment-legal regu-
lation in any of these areas will impact all of them.
We are still too close to the onset of the Internet age to deter-
mine whether it will spark a series of legal responses that can be
studied and understood as part of a larger whole. More
powerfully than any other legal scholar, Lawrence Lessig makes
the case for how the law should understand and respond to these
changes.5 Like other notable scholars in the area, Lessig's work
seeks to understand the implications of technological conver-
gence, the Internet, and the advent of digital technology across a
number of related legal areas-i.e., telecommunications regula-
tion, intellectual property, antitrust, and First Amendment law.
Each of these areas of information law, however, only addresses
a particular aspect of the challenge of information platform regu-
lation. Thus, only by pulling back the lens to see how all of these
areas interact can we appreciate the entire legal context for the
regulation of information platforms.
Before moving on to discuss some of the specifics of informa-
tion platform regulation, let me first acknowledge that this con-
ference will give short shrift to a set of important information
law concerns that will remain potential subjects for future
events. Most notably, there will be only very limited discussion
of how government will regulate content and commerce on the
Internet. But as recent court cases involving Yahoo's website
and the Child Online Protection Act make clear,6 these issues
will keep information lawyers busy in the years to come. Second,
because most information platforms relate to a network standard
or physical infrastructure that underpins the delivery of Internet
4. As then-Chief Judge Breyer put it, "[e]conomic regulators seek to achieve
[the goals of low prices, innovation, and efficient production methods] directly by
controlling prices through rules and regulations; antitrust seeks to achieve them
indirectly by promoting and preserving a [competitive] process that tends to bring
[these goals] about." Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 930 (1991).
5. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CON-
NECTED WORLD (2001).
6. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme 169 F.
Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002) (evaluat-
ing constitutionality of Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231 (Supp. V 1999))).
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content, we will focus less on issues related to the ability of copy-
right holders to limit what will be accessible on the Net. 7 My
expectation, however, is that even issues like content regulation
will make more sense-and fit more closely with other areas of
information law-when evaluated in reference to the concept of
information platforms.8
I. INFORMATION PLATFORMS, INSTANT MESSAGING, AND THE
FUTURE OF INFORMATION LAW
I expect that even many in the telecommunications field are
not accustomed to thinking about information platforms. For
those coming from the computer world, you will be familiar with
a "platform" as a synonym for an operating system.9 In the In-
ternet world, there are actually a series of information platforms
that build on top of one another. An instant messaging system,
for example, builds on top of the basic Internet protocol, which
can be accessed from any number of hardware devices connected
to the Internet, including cell phones, a cable modem, or a com-
puter that uses dial up access via an Internet Service Provider.
What all of these information platforms have in common is that
they rely on network standards around which complementary
products must be developed. Thus, for an information platform
to become successful, a sponsor of the technology must ensure "a
critical mass of adopters and a critical mass of complementary
software (and sometimes other components)." 10
By directing our analysis to platforms, I believe that we can
gain insight into three important themes. First, I believe that we
can better understand exactly how telecommunications regula-
tion, antitrust, intellectual property, and First Amendment law
7. For a discussion of this issue, see LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 5, at
250-58. See also, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001).
8. For another effort to build a framework for information law around the plat-
form concept, see Francois Bar & Christian Sandvig, Rules from Truth: Post-Con-
vergence Policy for Access 21-22, at http://www.stanford.edu/-fbar/Publications/
RulesfromTruth.pdf (last visited July 27, 2002) (paper presented at the 28th An-
nual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, Arlington VA, Sept 23-25,
2000).
9. See "Platform," WEBOPEDIA, at http://www.webopedia.comfrERM/p/plat
form.html (last visited July 27, 2002). But as those familiar with the computer
world understand, the platform concept is more complicated, as new middleware
technologies, such as a browser, can also serve as a platform. See United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining "middleware").
10. Timothy F. Bresnahan, New Modes of Competition: Implications for the Fu-
ture Structure of the Computer Industry, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE
MICROSOFT MONOPOLY (Jeffrey Eisenach & Thomas Lenard, eds., 1999), available at
http://www.pff.org/microsoft/bresnahan.html (last visited July 27, 2002).
2002]
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intersect in their respective missions. Intellectual property-as
well as real property-law defines the scope of a provider's con-
trol of its platform, whereas antitrust and telecommunications
law regulate whether-as well as when and how-access to a
platform should be granted. The First Amendment provides a
judicial check on congressional and agency regulation of informa-
tion platforms, both in terms of whether access can be denied to
would-be fair users of a platform11 as well as to whether govern-
ment can mandate access to an information platform. 12 In this
regard, only information platform regulation-as opposed to,
say, the regulation of physical platforms like railroads-impli-
cates intellectual property and First Amendment issues.
Second, the information platform concept also enables law-
yers to better identify and appreciate the relevant relationships
in a particular system of production and distribution. Some
providers will offer products that "substitute" for another-say,
broadband transport by a DSL telephone line as opposed to a
cable modem-while others will offer products that "comple-
ment" one another-such as, a broadband music provider that
relies on a high speed connection. Using the platform concept,
some products or services rely on or build on top of an informa-
tion platform, thereby adding value to that "network," whereas
others provide an alternative platform. As a number of econo-
mists have explained, how rival platforms relate to one another
and would-be complementors raises a number of competitive is-
sues, with the issue of whether and how interoperability is man-
aged being paramount.
13
The final crucial distinction highlighted by the platform con-
cept is that it reflects the Internet's layered architecture. In
short, the Internet operates as a modular system, where the crit-
ical commonality lies at the logical layer, with the open Trans-
mission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) standard,
and at the physical interconnection points between backbone
networks. This "end-to-end" and open architecture network de-
sign allows for diversity of the modes of physical access as well as
a plethora of applications and content developed to work with the
11. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001)
(evaluating constitutionality of Digital Millenium Copyright Act's access
restrictions).
12. See, e.g., Turner Broad. System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (evaluating
constitutionality of "must-carry" regulations).
13. For a good treatment of this subject, see Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell,
Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in Standardization, 8 J. ECON.
PERsp. 117 (1994).
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TCP/IP standard. 14 As envisioned by the Internet's pioneers, the
end-to-end principle envisions that the intelligence capabilities
of the network (i.e., the ability to activate an application) will
remain at the edges and that the middle of the network will func-
tion as a "dumb pipe. 15 In an era where proprietary develop-
ment introduces technologies that deviate from the end-to-end
principle by providing for a more intelligent network, the In-
ternet's architecture may well come to resemble something other
than the one envisioned by the leading Internet pioneers.'
6
The current state of the relevant fields that comprise "infor-
mation law" reflects the legacy of regimes that have grown up
without the benefit of cross-fertilization or reform efforts to en-
sure that they work well in tandem with one another. To be
sure, there are exceptions among the relevant court cases, such
as Judge Boudin's concurrence in the Lotus case.' 7 But in terms
of implementing a coherent competition policy strategy, informa-
tion platform regulation is still at a fairly immature stage.
To provide a context for understanding the nature of infor-
mation platform regulation, consider the instant messaging (IM)
market. For those uninitiated with the product, IM provides its
users with an opportunity to use the Internet for real-time com-
munication with one's "buddies," as AOL,' 8 who is credited with
popularizing the system, puts it.19 As of yet, however, the vari-
14. For this reason, the Internet's architecture can be described as having an
hourglass shape, with the logical layer-the TCP/IP standard-at the middle, the
physical layer below it, and applications (as well as content) riding on top of it. See
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE INTERNET'S COMING OF AGE 126-27 (2001)
(describing Internet architecture); Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model For Internet
Policy, 1 J. TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 37, 59-65 (2002) (same).
15. See Dale Hatfield, Preface, 8 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 1 (2000). For a clas-
sic articulation of the principle, see Jerome H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments
in System Design, 2 ACM TRANSACTIONS IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS 277 (1984), reprinted
in INNOVATIONS IN INTERNETWORKING 195 (Craig Patridge ed., 1988).
16. For a discussion of the forces challenging the end-to-end principle, see David
D. Clark & Marjory S. Blumenthal, Rethinking the Design of the Internet: The End
to End Arguments vs. the Brave New World (Aug. 10, 2000), at http://www.tprc.org/
abstracts00.rethinking.pdf.
17. See Lotus v. Borland, 49 F.3d 807, 821 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concur-
ring), affd by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
18. Technically, AOL offers two distinct instant messaging products: AOL's In-
stant Messager (AIM) and ICQ's instant messaging service. See Consent to the
Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations by Time Warner Inc.
and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner, Inc., Transferee, Mem-
orandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, 6606 n.379 [hereinafter AOL Or-
der]. For simplicity purposes, I shall refer to two products collectively as "AOL's
instant messaging services."
19. For a primer on the technology, see Jeff Tyson, How Instant Messaging
Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS.COM, at www.howstuffworks.com/instant-messaging.htm
(last visited July 27, 2002).
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ous IM providers have not made their systems-or "information
platforms"-interoperable. 20 In response, Microsoft and other ri-
vals insisted first that AOL accept an open standard promul-
gated by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a leading
Internet standard setting body, and later requested that the FCC
impose such a condition in approving the merger between AOL
and Time Warner.2 1 Even with the calls for "open access," IM
users today, like the telephone networks of the early 1900s,
2 2
cannot access another system without using two separate
networks.
The instant messaging example provides rich fodder for law
school exams and policy debates, and I have used it for both. Be-
cause it grew up on the Internet and thus defies the usual effort
to label it as an issue for telecom regulation, intellectual prop-
erty, or antitrust, it provides a quintessential case study for un-
derstanding information law as focused on the regulation of
information platforms. In short, IM highlights the role of intel-
lectual property in defining the scope of the right at issue as well
as how both antitrust and telecommunications regulation-sub-
ject to First Amendment limitations-can limit the scope of the
relevant property right.
In a debate that dates back to the late 1970s, when Congress
provided copyright protection for computer programs, 23 the intel-
lectual property status of IM raises the issue of whether its prod-
uct interfaces warrant protection.24 The answer to this question
20. See AOL Order, supra note 18, at 6619-20; see also Don Clark, AOL and
Apple Team Up to Offer Instant Messaging, WALL ST. J., July 30, 1999, at B6 (noting
that Instant Messaging could be a very important platform and discussing efforts to
create open access to AOL's customer base); Don Clark, Internet Rivals Attempt to
Open Up AOL's Instant Message System, WALL ST. J., July 26, 1999, at B2 (detailing
AOL's efforts to keep other services from accessing its Instant Messaging platform);
Jim Thompson, Microsoft and AOL Wage War Over Instant Messaging,
BOARDWATCH, Dec. 1999, at 78, 78-79 (noting that AOL justified its resistance to
open standards on the ground that it would compromise some of its software's fea-
tures and its users' security).
21. See Nick Wingfield, Changing Chat: Will Instant Messaging be the Dial Tone
of the Future?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2000, at R38 (noting efforts to lobby the FCC).
22. See MILTON L. MUELLER JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE: INTERCONNECTION, COMPE-
TITION, AND MONOPOLY IN THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM 45-46
(1997) (noting situation where AT&T refused to interconnect).
23. See FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS (July 31, 1978); see also H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, Part I,
96th Cong.2d Sess. 23 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6482 (1980); Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that Congress
"wrote into law the majority's recommendations almost verbatim").
24. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663
(criticizing the basic premises and methodology of the report).
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would appear to be yes, but a series of exceptions leaves the issue
cloudy.25 As of yet, the providers of IM, particularly AOL, have
been able to keep rivals from accessing its Names and Presence
Directory (NPD) through technological fixes.26 Thus, unlike the
record companies in the Napster litigation, AOL has not gone to
court to enforce its proprietary rights to its IM system.2 7 But in
the event that AOL could not prevent a software program from
facilitating interoperability, 28 it may well test its IP rights as a
means of defeating interoperability.
29
Intellectual property law actually presents a variety of puz-
zles related to regulating open access to rival products.
30 Signifi-
cantly, the issue of interoperability will increasingly be raised in
the legal arena because standard setting committees, such as the
IETF, are no longer able to get out in front of the market to ad-
dress the issue, as they were able to do when the Internet com-
munity was smaller and largely comprised of non-commercial
actors.31 In light of the changing nature of the Internet commu-
nity, standard setting-and particularly whether a standard is
open or under proprietary control-will be a compelling topic for
years to come. Finally, if a provider of IM ever sues AOL for mo-
nopolistic conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,32 that
25. See, e.g., Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1547 (11th Cir. 1996)
(stating that "[ilt is an incorrect statement of the law that interface specifications
are not copyrightable as a matter of law," but then setting forth a series of excep-
tions, most notably, fair use and misuse).
26. See Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Clash of the Titans Erupts Over AOL's Instant
Messaging, WASH. POST, July 24, 1999, at Al; Don Clark, Microsoft Ends Row with
AOL Over Instant Messaging, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 1999, at B13.
27. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001).
28. See Ben Charny, Cell Phone IM Plan Supports Interoperability, CNET
NEWS.COM, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1004-200-7866405.html (Nov. 13, 2001)
(noting that some software companies have developed means of facilitating inter-
operability); see also Paul Festa, IM Start-up on Crash Course with AOL, CNET
NEWS.coM, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-840981.html (Feb. 20, 2002) (detailing
clashes between AOL and PalTalk); Lisa M. Bowman, AOL Blocks Instant Messag-
ing Start-up, CNET NEWS.coM, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-826625.html
(Jan. 30, 2002) (detailing clashes between AOL and Trillian).
29. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat'l Health Care Discount, Inc., 121 F. Supp.
2d 1255 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (legal action by AOL against marketers who have found
ways to circumvent filtering programs and who continue to "spam" AOL customers).
30. See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Pol-
icy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003).
31. See Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering:
Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1309 (1998)
("Achievement of stability in self-regulated commons is often thought to be depen-
dent on the degree to which the cooperators are a close-knit, homogenous cultural
group.").
32. Section 2 prohibits any individuals or firms from acting to: "monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
2002]
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would raise the question as to whether an intellectual property
right immunizes a company from a duty to deal under antitrust.
The only existing regulation of instant messaging interoper-
ability comes from the FCC's decision to impose a limited inter-
connection mandate as part of its approval of the AOL/Time
Warner merger.33 It is only appropriate that this action consti-
tute a harbinger for the future of information law, as the merger
itself presented an unambiguous commitment to a convergence
between computing, entertainment, and telecommunications. As
befitting of such a venture, the FCC's decision to regulate AOL's
instant messaging product provides an important glimpse at
some of the issues ahead in the emerging field of information
law.34
II. DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION,
AND THE CHALLENGE OF INFORMATION LAW
The instant messaging case highlights how the central tool
of telecommunications law-an interconnection mandate-
presents regulators with a bad case of d6jA vu. At the dawn of
telecommunications regulation in the early 1900s, policymakers
allowed AT&T to buy up competitors, declined to order intercon-
nection, and ultimately concluded that "the network" was a natu-
ral monopoly and that a single firm should provide
telecommunications service to all consumers. 35 In most cases,
this company was the Bell System and, to protect consumers
from this supposed natural monopoly, the federal and state gov-
ernments established regulatory commissions to regulate all
parts of the business. As for wireless communications, the need
for coordination so as to avoid interference provided the justifica-
tion for government regulation. In this case, the government not
only licensed monopoly providers, but also embarked on a regime
of content regulation as justified by the existence of such
monopolies.
36
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States." 15 U.S.C.
§ 2 (1994).
33. See AOL Order, supra note 18.
34. For differing assessments of this theme, compare Philip J. Weiser, Standard
Setting, Internet Governance, and Self-Regulation, 28 N. KENT. L.J. 822 (2001) (eval-
uating it critically) with Daniel L. Rubinfield & Hal J. Singer, Open Access to Broad-
band Networks: A Case Study of the AOL / Time Warner Merger, 16 BERKELEY. TECH.
L.J. 631, 637, 674 (2001) (endorsing it).
35. For a description of this history, see MUELLER, supra note 22.
36. The Supreme Court upheld this regulatory regime, as consistent with the
First Amendment, in NBC v. FCC, 319 U.S. 190, 236-37 (1942).
LAW AND INFORMATION PLATFORMS
Given the command-and-control approach of early telecom-
munications law, it coexisted in an uneasy fashion with antitrust
policy and First Amendment law. In terms of antitrust, the Bell
System faced a continuous set of questions as to whether its com-
mitment to "one system, one service" reflected sound economics,
or merely the use of regulation to prevent competition.
37 Ulti-
mately, antitrust-and technological change-prevailed, trans-
forming the presumption of telecommunications law from one
committed to monopoly regulation to facilitating competition.
38
The FCC's decisions along the way marked an unsteady path,
but even before the Telecommunications Act of 1996 settled the
question by statute, the FCC's commitment to competition (as
well as that of a number of states) was well established.
39
As to wireless communications, the prospect of the third gen-
eration wireless telephone service and the transition to digital
television present the FCC with a number of intriguing opportu-
nities. Similarly, the advent of first cable and then satellite tech-
nology put to rest-at least in the marketplace, if not in the law
books 4 0-the idea that spectrum was "scarce" and deserved spe-
cial First Amendment treatment.4 ' As different communication
technologies all move to a digital architecture, telecommunica-
tions will increasingly defy classification by the particular con-
duit used to deliver the message. The medium will no longer, at
least in terms of the "pipe" used to deliver it, be the message.
Instead, a bit will be a bit will be a bit.4 2
37. See James B. Speta, Maintaining Competition in Information Platforms:
Some Thoughts on Vertical Restrictions in Emerging Telecommunications Markets, 1
J. TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 185, 195-202 (2002) (discussing antitrust issues of
Bell System).
38. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom,
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
39. For a discussion of the competitive and regulatory landscape before the 1996
Telecom Act, see Craig D. Dingwall, The Last Mile: A Race For Local Telecommuni-
cations Competition Policy, 48 FED. COMM. L.J. 105 (1995).
40. To this day, Red Lion Broad. Co., Inc., v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969),
which set forth a lower First Amendment standard for broadcast regulation based
on a scarcity rationale, remains good law. See also Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC,
105 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (applying Red Lion in upholding regulation of direct
broadcast satellite licenses). For a discussion of the different standards in First
Amendment analysis, see Ellen P. Goodman, Bargains in the Information Market-
place: The Use of Government Subsidies to Regulate New Media, 1 J. TELECOMMS. &
HIGH TECH. L. 217 (2002).
41. For a discussion of this issue, see Philip J. Weiser, Promoting Informed De-
liberation and a First Amendment Doctrine for a Digital Age: Towards a New Regu-
latory Regime for Broadcast Regulation, in DELIBERATION, DEMOCRACY, AND THE
MEDIA 11 (Simone Chambers ed., 2000).
42. See David S. Isenberg, The Dawn of the Stupid Network, ACM NETWORKER,
Feb./Mar., 1998, at 24, 28, available at www.isen.com/papers/Dawnstupid.html
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The two fundamental transforming dynamics of the informa-
tion age appear to be the digital transformation predicted by
Negroponte 43 and the networked world envisioned by Metcalfe.
44
In particular, the Internet has emerged as the "killer platform"
that provides individuals and companies with an opportunity to
deploy multimedia applications, constrained only by their imagi-
nation, current data processing technology, and the bandwidth
available to users. Unlike proprietary networks, the Internet
does not rely on a particular form of technology or belong to any
individual; rather, it is a "network of networks," whose key proto-
cols are all in the public domain. Most particularly, the Internet
reflects a commitment by a series of networks to "interconnect"
and use the common TCP/IP protocol.
45
Telecommunications regulation is still in the early stages of
responding to the new reality defined by the Internet. A couple
of years ago, Vint Cerf and Bob Kahn, two early Internet pio-
neers, predicted that the Internet will overtake telecommunica-
tions usage sometime shortly after 2006.46 At some point down
the road, traditional telecommunications usage as we knew it-
either through the use of fax or voice communications-may ulti-
mately cease to exist at all, with all traffic traveling over the In-
ternet as a digital application-be it, voice, video or data.47 As
("Because IP makes the details of the network irrelevant, all that matters is that the
bits sent by your machine are received by my machine, and vice versa.").
43. See NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL (1995).
44. Bob Metcalfe, the founder of 3Com, is credited with the insight that a net-
work of computers grows quadratically more valuable as more individuals are con-
nected to it. See George Gilder, Metcalfe's Law and Legacy, FORBES ASAP, Sept. 13,
1993, at 158, 160. In the economics literature, this point is often described as a
"network externality" or "network effect." See Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Sys-
tems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 94 (1994) ("Because the
value of membership to one user is positively affected when another user joins and
enlarges the network, such markets are said to exhibit 'network effects,' or 'network
externalities.'").
45. See Robert E. Kahn & Vinton G. Cerf, What is the Internet (and what Makes
it Work), INTERNET POLICY INSTITUTE, at http://www.internetpolicy.org/briefing/12-
99_story.html (Dec. 1999); see also James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Approach To
Internet Interconnection, 54 FED. COMM. L.J. 225, 245-47 (2002).
46. As Kahn & Cerf explained:
[Tihe total numbers of host computers and users have been growing at about
33% every six months since 1988-or roughly 80% per year. The telephone
service, in comparison, grows an average of about 5-10% per year. That
means if the Internet keeps growing steadily the way it has been growing
over the past few years, it will be nearly as big as today's telephone system by
about 2006.
Kahn & Cerf, supra note 45.
47. See Werbach, supra note 14, at 45 ("The Internet is going to swallow tele-
communications. Data traffic is growing much faster than voice, and promises to
dominate future capacity demands on all major networks.").
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Kevin Werbach convincingly explains, this specter haunts tele-
communications regulation and requires that, at some point,
telecommunications regulation will be linked inextricably with
Internet regulation. 48 Put simply, it makes no sense to regulate
telecommunications and leave the Internet unregulated.
49
In the wake of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which
embraced technological convergence and sought to facilitate com-
petition, 50 the FCC is still struggling to revise its legacy regula-
tory framework to better respond to technological realities.
Given that the Act barely contemplated the importance of the In-
ternet and did not disturb a category-based regulatory strategy
(e.g., one with distinct approaches for broadcast, cable, and tele-
phone networks), this should not be a surprise.5 1 A classic dis-
tinction that the FCC employed to avoid regulating the computer
industry was its judgment that "enhanced" services were ancil-
lary to communications and could be left unregulated by the
FCC. In the Telecom Act, Congress adopted the AT&T consent
decree court's term, "information services," to replace the earlier
48. Id at 38 (calling on policymakers to "reformulate communications policy
with the Internet at the center"); id. at 46 ("communications policy will be a subset
of Internet policy, rather than the reverse").
49. Early commentary-and even policymakers-suggested that the Internet
could exist in a hermetically sealed unregulated universe. See, e.g., David R. John-
son & David G. Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 1367 (1996); Presidential Directive on Electronic Commerce, at http://www.
ecommerce.gov/presiden.htm (July 1997). Fortunately, the current FCC Chairman
takes a different perspective. See Law in the Internet Age, Remarks of Michael K.
Powell, FCC Commissioner, Before D.C. Bar Ass'n Computer and Telecomms. Law
Section and the Fed. Comm. Bar Ass'n, (Sept. 29, 1999), at http://www.fcc.gov/
Speeches/Powell2000/spmkpOO2.html ("The important public policy question is not
whether to regulate the Internet or not, as if that were a realistic choice. Rather, it
is how to regulate it responsibly in a manner that maximizes consumer welfare and
does not stunt its infinite growth and innovation potential.").
50. See Pub. L. No. 104-104, purpose statement, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996).
51. See Werbach, supra note 14, at 42 ("The 1996 Act did not contemplate the
radical changes the Internet is bringing to the communications world."); John
Nakahata, Regulating Information Platforms: The Challenge of Rewriting Commu-
nications Regulation from the Bottom Up, 1J. TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 95, 96
(2002) ("Despite all the talk of convergence, regulation in the United States has not
kept pace."); id. at 97 ("Congress has yet to acknowledge that it has a significant role
to play in addressing the implications of convergence and the rise of the Internet
Protocol for today's regulatory system."); J. SCOTT MARCUS, THE POTENTIAL RELE-
VANCE TO THE UNITED STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S NEWLY ADOPTED FRAME-
WORK FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1 (FCC, OPP Working Paper No. 36, July 2002),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Daily-Releases/Daily-Business/2002/dbO711/DOC-
224213A2.pdf (the Internet decouples the application-e.g., voice or video-from the
underlying method of transmission-i.e., cable or telephony); NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, BROADBAND: BRINGING HOME THE BITS 32 (2002) (Telecom Act "does not
fully reflect the convergent nature of broadband"-i.e., the ability to deliver similar
set of services from the Internet).
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"enhanced services" definition and sought to maintain them as
unregulated services.5 2 Thus, how the FCC classifies and regu-
lates services like Internet telephony that blend the two will
shape profoundly the structure of the next generation regulatory
regime.
5 3
To protect enhanced service providers and afford them relia-
ble vertical access to the telecommunications network, the FCC
imposed on local telephone companies a series of regulations
under its Computer I, Computer II, and Computer III regimes.54
Initially, these regimes provided for structural separation be-
tween an incumbent provider's telecommunications and en-
hanced service operations, but ultimately allowed the
incumbents to provide such services on an integrated basis. In so
doing, however, the Commission took the important step of in-
sisting on non-discriminatory access obligations to ensure that
the telecommunications network could be used for a variety of
services (e.g., Internet access) and that rival companies could
market equipment like modems that could connect to the net-
work. As the Internet developed, it became clear that it would be
used for, among other things, voice communication in a manner
similar to the circuit-switched telephone network and thus the
old hard-and-fast distinction between the regulated telecommu-
nications world and the unregulated Internet world would be dif-
ficult to maintain.5 5 Even in the face of this reality, some
policymakers still call for an "unregulation" of the Internet under
a model consistent with the Computer inquiries. 56
52. 47 U.S.C. §153(20) (Supp V. 1999); see also Joseph D. Kearney, From the
Fall of the Bell System to the Telecommunications Act: Regulation of Telecommuni-
cations, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1395, 1414, n.55 (1999) (discussing term).
53. See Werbach, supra note 14, at 42-44 (discussing FCC's struggles with the
issue).
54. See Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regula-
tions, Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 432-33 (1980). Numerous commentators
have detailed this history. See Steve Bickerstaff, Shackles on the Giant: How the
Federal Government Created Microsoft, Personal Computers, and the Internet, 78
TEx. L. REV. 1, 7-21 (1999); JASON OXMAN, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE
INTERNET (FCC, OPP Working Paper No. 31, July 1999), available at http://www.fcc.
gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp3l.pdf.
55. See Bar & Sandvig, supra note 8, at 19 (such efforts create "dysfunctional
distinctions meant to reconcile new communications services with old rules"). For
an example of some of the issues that challenge such distinctions, see Federal-State
Joint Board on Universal Service, Report to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 11501, 11541,
11543 (1998) (adopting a "wait and see" approach to regulating Internet telephony);
Speta, supra note 37, at 203-205 (discussing Internet backbone issue); Dale
Hatfield, supra note 15, at 2-3 (same).
56. See OxmAN, supra note 54. A more appropriate conception along these lines
would not be to call for unregulation as such, but simply to resist imposing legacy
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The Internet's open architecture depends on a series of lay-
ers, each of which can potentially be controlled by a proprietary
"gatekeeper." Consequently, policies for the Internet may not be
able to simply assume that the gates will be at the "physical"
layer, though protecting competition at that layer may be a par-
ticularly suitable job for telecommunications regulation. De-
pending on how the Internet evolves, an Internet portal, Internet
Service Provider, or possibly a browser product, could attempt to
leverage a dominant position in a manner that might discrimi-
nate against rival applications. 57 As the FCC faces requests to
regulate either physical/hardware or logical/software Internet
products, it will undoubtedly revisit its historic reluctance to reg-
ulate the Internet and, in order to discipline itself and guide com-
panies, it will need to articulate a clear analytical structure for
examining requests to regulate the architecture of new informa-
tion platforms.
58
In the face of the Internet's emergence and the advent of
competition between information platforms that are retooling to
compete to deliver digital services, different schools of thought
have rushed in to provide guidance to policymakers. In an ambi-
tious critique of agency regulation, Peter Huber contends that
there is no independent role for telecommunications regulation,
underscoring that questionable past decisions render doubtful
any potential that the FCC would play a useful role in facilitat-
ing and safeguarding competition. 59 In an alternate course,
which I think much more promising, Kevin Werbach's thoughtful
essay suggests that telecommunications regulation should be
viewed as an instrument of Internet policy and, additionally,
view its own task in light of the architecture that defines the In-
ternet.60 In a similar vein, a number of commentators, most no-
regulations lock, stock, and barrel. See Robert Pepper, Policy Changes Necessary to
Meet Internet Development, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 255, 259 (2001).
57. For a discussion of "leveraging" and the underlying economic considerations,
see Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity Vertical Integration, and Open
Access Policies, Towards A Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation, available at
http://stiet.si.umich.edu/researchseminar/farrell-Septl.pdf (forthcoming 2003).
58. See Weiser, supra note 34, at 846.
59. See PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND
LET COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM 7 (1997) (arguing that the FCC "should shut
its doors once and for all"); see also John W. Berresford, The Future of the FCC:
Promote Competition, then Relax, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 731, 736 (1998) (listing, among
past failures of the FCC, its six year delay in allowing MCI to enter the private line
long distance market and its twelve year delay in allowing entry into the mobile
telephone market after it was technically feasible).
60. See Werbach, supra note 14, at 37-39. This approach also echoes the second
generation Internet scholarship that rejects the non-regulation model set out by ear-
lier commentators. See, e.g., Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis,
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tably Yochai Benkler, advocate using the Internet-type model of
a common standard to enable spectrum to be regulated as a
"commons" (in addition to, or instead of, through private prop-
erty rights), where equipment providers and users are regulated
through adherence to current protocols. 61 In a move that sug-
gests that the agency is willing to experiment with such an ap-
proach, the FCC recently approved the use of "ultrawideband"
technology, which will provide equipment suppliers and service
providers access to free, unlicensed spectrum, provided they ad-
here to certain technical limitations.62
In evaluating the role of law in regulating information, there
is a danger both of losing sight of the forest from the trees as well
as getting ahead of the state of technology in evaluating appro-
priate policy. By developing an understanding of information
law that is broader than the various technologies it is charged
with regulating, the FCC can establish itself as a valued partner
to antitrust and intellectual property law in regulating the con-
verging worlds of telecommunications, computing, and entertain-
ment.63 In particular, the next several years will begin to reveal
whether the FCC implements effectively a tripartite challenge:
managing a transition from monopolized markets to competitive
ones (at least as to ones where competition does develop), devel-
oping competition policy for an Internet age, 64 and protecting the
public values it is charged to safeguard. To understand the scope
85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1183 (1999) ("[Sltudy of the Internet also works from a suffi-
ciently general denominator: the set of standards that define the Internet.").
61. See Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the
Digitally Networked Environment, 11 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 287 (1998).
62. See Martin Reynolds, FCC Cuts the Wires, CNET NEWS.coM, at http://news.
com.com/2009-1033-839110.html (Feb. 15, 2001); see also Amendment of Part 15 of
the Commission's Rules Regarding Spread Spectrum Devices, First Report and Or-
der, 15 F.C.C.R. 16244 (2000) (allowing spread spectrum technologies, which can
"hop" from different frequencies to one another, to operate on an unlicensed basis
under Part 15 of the FCC's rules).
63. Given the task before it, some commentators are understandably skeptical
that the FCC can fulfill this role, at least in its current form. See Tom W. Bell, The
Common Law in Cyberspace, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1746, 1750 (1999) ("[T]o judge from
the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission, federal
agencies that regulate networks appear uniquely vulnerable to fatal reforms.");
John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Real-
ism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. CoLo. L. REV. 1071 (2000) (arguing
that the FCC should look to the Patent and Trademark Office model for guidance).
For a discussion of how telecommunications regulation can evolve to work in part-
nership with antitrust, see Philip J. Weiser, The Imperative of Harmonization Be-
tween Antitrust and Regulation, 698 PLI/PAT 73 (2002).
64. Sound competition policy includes, among other things, an appreciation for
how regulation will affect parties' incentives to invest in new facilities. See Larry F.
Darby & Joseph Fuhr, Investment Incentives and Local Competition at the FCC, 9
FALL MEDIA L. & POLICY 1 (2000); Digital Broadband Migration Part II, Press Con-
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of this mission, it is important to evaluate the complementary
role played by antitrust oversight, to which this essay now turns.
III. ANTITRUST OVERSIGHT IN THE INFORMATION AGE
Over the last several years, antitrust law has begun to con-
front two of the most formidable obstacles it faces as a regulatory
tool for the information age. The first challenge is the ability of
antitrust enforcers and courts to react quickly to anticompetitive
market developments and institute an effective remedial re-
sponse. Like the AT&T case twenty years before, 65 the Microsoft
litigation tested the ability of antitrust courts to respond to pred-
atory conduct by a platform monopolist. 66 It is too soon to deter-
mine whether this antitrust action will serve its intended
mission, but, as Lawrence Lessig suggested in recent testimony,
even the flawed decree accepted by the federal government in-
cludes some important restrictions on Microsoft's conduct, 67 al-
though the effectiveness of its enforcement regime is suspect.
68
In a second, but less high profile, challenge to antitrust, it re-
mains to be seen whether intellectual property law will displace
antitrust oversight. 69 Taken together, the development of these
issues-the antitrust consequences of abusing control of a mo-
nopoly information platform and antitrust's relationship with in-
ference by Michael Powell (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/
Powell/2001/spmkpl09.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2002).
65. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom,
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
66. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
67. In terms of its flaws, the proposed settlement, for example, does not address
the Court of Appeals' conclusion that Microsoft's actions related to Java as well as
its commingling of code to disadvantage competitors constituted part of its illegal
course of conduct. See id. at 76 (discussing deception of Java developers as a means
to undermine the Java standard); id. at 66 (concluding that Microsoft's commingling
of browsing and non-browsing code had an anticompetitive effect by deterring the
installation of rival browsers). For a discussion of the potential impact of the de-
cree's restrictions, see Dan Carney, Microsoft Could Still Lose a Lot of Yardage, Bus-
INESS WEEK, Dec. 24, 2001, at 35.
68. See The Microsoft Settlement: A Look To The Future, Hearing before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Dec. 12, 2001) (statement of Lawrence Lessig,
Professor of Law, Stanford Law School), at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.
cfm?id=135&witid=104 (last visited Aug. 1, 2002).
69. In a similar, but less well developed challenge to antitrust, the Seventh Cir-
cuit suggested the possibility that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 bars any an-
titrust challenges related to the market opening obligations set out by the Act. See
Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Philip J.
Weiser, Goldwasser, The Telecom Act, and Reflections on Antitrust Remedies (forth-
coming 2003) (challenging position); Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae, In-
termedia Communications, Inc. v. Bell South Telecomms., Inc., (11th Cir.) (No. 01-
10224-JJ) (filed Mar. 28, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f7700/
7777.htm.
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tellectual property-will shape how antitrust regulates other
information platforms like instant messaging.
Although courts once suggested that antitrust and intellec-
tual property worked in tension with one another,70 both regimes
now recognize the importance-and, to a lesser degree, the lim-
its-of protecting property to encourage investment and innova-
tion.71 In terms of working together to foster compatibility
between rival platforms, intellectual property rules can facilitate
the development of a shared standard by allowing reverse engi-
neering-i.e., using a finished product and working backwards to
determine how it was actually made. 72 But there will be a num-
ber of cases where this "self-help" option is not sufficient. At pre-
sent, intellectual property protection continues to protect a
dominant standard-for example, patent protection for the inter-
faces for Microsoft's Windows operating system-because the
contours of the reverse engineering doctrine have not been fully
developed. 73 Moreover, even where reverse engineering is le-
gally permissible, it may well not be practically effective-either
because the interfaces will keep changing or the relevant code is
just too cumbersome to replicate in an efficient manner, as is the
70. See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 308 (1948) (pat-
ent pool invalidated under antitrust laws).
71. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) ('The aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws . . .are actually
complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry, and compe-
tition."); DOJ & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, Sec. 1 (1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 20,734 at P 13,132
Sec. 1 (April 1, 1995) ("The intellectual property laws and the antitrust laws share
the common purpose of promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.");
Sheila F. Anthony, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to
Partners, 28 AIPLA Q. J. 1, 3 (2000) (innovation "depend[s] vitally on a legal frame-
work that ensures a competitive market while protecting the rights of inventors and
allowing innovators to profit from their ideas and inventions."); Timothy J. Muris,
Chairman, FTC, Competition and Intellectual Property Policy: The Way Ahead, Re-
marks before A.B.A. Antitrust Section Fall Forum (Nov. 15, 2001), at http://www.ftc.
gov/speeches/muris/intellectual.htm (explaining that "[t]he tensions between [anti-
trust and intellectual property doctrine] tend to obscure the fact that, properly un-
derstood, IP law and antitrust law both seek to promote innovation and enhance
consumer welfare"). For recent commentary, see James B. Kobak, Jr., Running the
Gauntlet: Antitrust and Intellectual Property Pitfalls on the Two Sides of the Atlan-
tic, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 341, 342-50 (1996); Maureen O'Rourke, Striking a Delicate
Balance: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, Contract, and Standardization in the Com-
puter Industry, 12 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (1998); Willard K. Tom & Joshua A.
Newberg, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified
Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167 (1997).
72. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974) (defining
term).
73. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 16-29 (2001) (describing legal treatment of
reverse engineering).
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case with Microsoft's Windows operating system. 74 For such
cases, a permissive intellectual property regime might not be suf-
ficient to facilitate a competitive market; consequently, it is im-
portant that antitrust oversight remains a check on a firm's
control of a dominant standard.
Despite the joint commitment to facilitate innovation and ec-
onomic welfare, courts, commentators and enforcers have yet to
harmonize satisfactorily antitrust and the intellectual property
regime. 75 On the joint mission of antitrust and intellectual prop-
erty, it is crucial to appreciate that both respect the importance
of property as a means of enabling developers to appropriate re-
wards from risky investments. With respect to the essential fa-
cilities principle, for example, antitrust courts and commentators
view this doctrine as exceptional in the same manner that intel-
lectual property recognizes its role in protecting investment in-
centives and thus hesitates to impose compulsory licenses.
76 Put
simply, even where an after-the-fact (ex post) regulation appears
to promote competition, antitrust law teaches that imposing
sharing requirements on a company's invention undermines
before-the-fact (ex ante) incentives to invest. Despite this appre-
ciation within antitrust, there is a growing movement to bar or
limit Section 2 claims related to denials of access to intellectual
property. 7
7
As some courts and commentators would have it, intellectual
property development deserves different treatment under anti-
trust than real property. In particular, some argue that where
74. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 1999); see
also Jonathan Band, Paragraph 52: A Window into Judge Jackson's Findings of
Fact, 17 COMPUTER LAWYER 3 (2000).
75. As Maureen O'Rourke put it, "[tihe goal seems simple enough-to encourage
innovation-but because the two sets of laws attempt to do so in such different man-
ners, the potential for conflict is present." O'Rourke, supra note 71, at 37.
76. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, 707, at 180 (rev. ed. 1996)
("diminishing the inventor's reward reduces incentives for inventive activity and
seems inconsistent with the premise of the patent system."); Phillip Areeda, Essen-
tial Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 852
(1990) ("[clompulsory access, if it exists at all, is and should be very exceptional.");
see also, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(explaining that the limited copyright monopoly "is intended to motivate the crea-
tive activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward"); Alaska
Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536, 545-46 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that con-
trol over passenger reservation system is not sufficiently susceptible to abuse to con-
stitute an essential facility).
77. See Image Technical Servs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th
Cir. 1997) (viewing the possession of an intellectual property right as a presump-
tively valid legitimate business reason), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1094 (1998); Data
Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1187 (1st Cir. 1994)
(same).
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an allegedly illegal action is an anticompetitive refusal to deal in
Kodak's intellectual property 78-as opposed to Aspen Ski's devel-
oped ski slope 79-antitrust law should refrain from assigning lia-
bility to Kodak even if the same legal standard is met in each
case.80 Presumably, advocates of this position believe that a
stronger protection of property is necessary to facilitate invest-
ment in intellectual property-as opposed to real property-de-
velopment, as a duty to deal requirement imposed in either case
could effectuate the same type of impingement on the ability to
appropriate one's investment.8 1 But as a number of commenta-
tors have explained, there is no real basis for distinguishing be-
tween the two.8 2 Thus, understood properly, both antitrust and
intellectual property (like real property law) protect property
rights to stimulate investment, but neither condone exclusionary
denials of access just because the interface at issue might lay
claim to intellectual property protection.
8 3
78. See Kodak, 125 F.3d at 1218.
79. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
80. For one such argument, see Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket:
Cross-Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard-Setting, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE
ECONOMY 133 (Jaffe et al., eds.) (2001), available at haas.berkeley.edu/-shapiro/
thicket.pdf (treating intellectual property like real property is "stunn[ing]" and call-
ing for an immunity for intellectual property holders against a duty to deal theory).
Presumably, Shapiro would avoid allowing this immunity to prevent an owner of an
information platform interface (say, Microsoft) from using its intellectual property
right to avoid liability by maintaining that such interfaces should not be patentable
or subject to copyright protection. But current intellectual property rules allow the
patenting of interfaces. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications
of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 529 (1998) (noting that Microsoft
has patented its key interfaces).
81. DOJ & FTC, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, § 2.1 (1995), available at www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.
htm (explaining that that the same antitrust principles apply to intellectual prop-
erty as to real property). Admittedly, investments in intellectual property, unlike
real property, are more easily appropriated by free riders, but antitrust thus must
distinguish between restraints designed to protect investment versus those designed
to exclude competitors. One intriguing position for resolving this difficulty is to ex-
empt "pure" intellectual property-i.e., protected technologies-from duty to deal
requirements, but to allow any products produced or deployed to be subject to such
requirements. See Mark R. Patterson, When is Property Intellectual? The Leverag-
ing Problem, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1134 (2000) (noting that courts have over-
looked this potential solution to the issue).
82. See Steven Semeraro, Regulating Information Platforms: The Convergence to
Antitrust, 1 J. TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 143, 152-67 (2002); A. Douglas Me-
lamed & Ali M. Stoeppelwerth, The CSU Case: Facts, Formalism, and the Intersec-
tion of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming
2002); Glen Robinson, On Refusing to Deal to Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1177,
1210-11 & n.148 (2002).
83. The Department of Justice recently set forth an antitrust principle to imple-
ment this point. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11-12, CSU,
L.L.C. v. Xerox, 121 S. Ct. 1077 (2001) (No. 00-62), available at http://www.usdoj.
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In defining the relationship between antitrust and intellec-
tual property, it is important for courts to remain focused on the
two regimes' shared purpose in facilitating investment, innova-
tion, and competition. In a particularly egregious failure to do
that, the Federal Circuit recently held that if a denied input
(such as a part used in servicing a product) is protected under the
patent laws, there is little or no room for antitrust liability re-
lated to the use or terms of sale of the input.8 4 Under such a
theory, a patented interface for, say, interconnection between lo-
cal and long distance networks would possibly have barred anti-
trust liability for AT&T's discriminatory interconnection
arrangements,8 5 or any number of otherwise recognized antitrust
claims.86 Indeed, this ruling led some commentators to suggest
that Microsoft could prevail in its case on the ground that its pat-
ented interfaces and/or copyrighted operating system were im-
munized from any duty to deal requirements under the antitrust
laws.8 7 Happily, in the Microsoft case, the D.C. Circuit rejected
gov/osg/briefs/2000/2pet/6invit/2000-0062.pet.ami.inv.pdf (quoting Aspen Skiing Co.
v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) and citing ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 144 (2d ed. 1993) on predatory conduct) (arguing
that antitrust liability in relation to licensing IP should arise when the IP holder
"sacrific[es] profit available from exercising monopoly power in order to exclude com-
petition and thereby to create additional market power").
84. See In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir.
2000). In particular, the ISO court suggested that antitrust liability could lie as to
the exercise of IP rights only where (1) the asserted patent was obtained by fraud;
(2) the infringement suit was a mere sham; or (3) the IP right was used in an illegal
tie. For an example of how this principle has been applied to bar antitrust litigation,
see Townshend v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., No. C99-0400, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 5070
(N.D. Cal., Mar. 28, 2000) ("Because a patent owner has the legal right to refuse to
license his or her patent on any terms, [and therefore] the existence of a predicate
condition to a license agreement cannot state the antitrust violation"). It is plausi-
ble that the case could be defined narrowly as merely prescribing the scope of anti-
trust liability for actions taken in relation to the prosecution and enforcement of a
patent, but it is hard to justify such a narrow reading.
85. See MCI v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891
(1983) (holding AT&T liable for such discriminatory interconnection under an essen-
tial facilities theory); see also Melamed & Stoeppelwerth, supra note 82 (offering this
example).
86. See Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersec-
tion of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 919-23 (2001)
(criticizing decision).
87. See, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Intellectual Property, Antitrust
and the New Economy, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 453, 471 (2001). While this fear is
slightly exaggerated (as not all of Microsoft's challenged actions related to its intel-
lectual property rights as such), it merits attention. If, as some commentators ar-
gue, an IP holder could not be required under antitrust to "sell or license the
technology covered by [an IP right]," then a refusal by Microsoft to release patented
APIs to Netscape-say, where Microsoft released such APIs to non-rivals-could not
give rise to antitrust liability. David McGowan, Networks and Intention in Antitrust
and Intellectual Property, 24 J. CORP. L. 485, 491 (1999).
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this type of argument, responding with the analogy that intellec-
tual property no more confers such a right than the argument
"that use of one's personal property, such as a baseball bat" is
immunized from tort liability."" Presumably, this ruling not only
governs liability questions, but also remedial ones, such as the
requirement in the proposed consent decree that Microsoft dis-
close its application programming interfaces for middleware
products in the same fashion it does for its own.89
The three most obvious defenses of the immunization posi-
tion strike me as fatally flawed. First, advocates of this view
may well oppose the imposition of any duty to deal in a product
market defined strictly as an "aftermarket" in one company's
products and use the intellectual property defense to eviscerate
this claim.90 To be sure, it is questionable whether "aftermarket"
access claims properly sound in antitrust-as opposed to con-
tract9 1-but the better approach is to reject or narrow this claim,
88. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see id.
(terming Microsoft's argument that it has an "absolute and unfettered right to use
its intellectual property as it wishes" as "border[ing] on the frivolous"); see also id.
(balancing interest in maintaining control of desktop interface with marginal an-
ticompetitive impact).
89. Sections III. D & E of the proposed decree do just that. See United States v.
Microsoft, Revised Proposed Final Judgment, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
cases/f9400/9495.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2002); see also The Microsoft Settlement: A
Look To The Future, Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
(Dec. 12, 2001) (statement of Charles James, Assistant Attorney Gen. for the Anti-
trust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print testi-
mony.cfm?id=135&witid=98 (terming this aspect of the remedy "the most effective
avenue for restoring the competitive potential of middleware").
90. See Eastman Kodak Corp. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992)
(recognizing this claim); see also Thomas C. Arthur, Formalistic Line Drawing: Ex-
clusion of Unauthorized Services from Single Brand Aftermarkets Under Kodak and
Sylvania, 24 J. CORP. L. 603 (1999) (criticizing claim). Notably, the courts have nar-
rowed this claim-thereby sidestepping some potential objections to it-by making
clear that only a party subject to a "bait and switch" tactic can challenge a primary
market platform's treatment of competition in an aftermarket. See Digital Equip.
Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 763 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J.)
(emphasizing that if Kodak had not facilitated aftermarket competition and/or had
informed its customers that it might cease to do so, it would not have been liable);
PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 820 (6th Cir. 1997) (high-
lighting the unanticipated change in policy as basis of antitrust liability), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct. 2434 (1997); Lee v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 23 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir.
1994) (same). Indeed, this might explain how some commentators like Carl Shapiro,
who criticize the imposition of a duty to deal on Kodak's intellectual property, also
advocate the imposition of such duties on Microsoft's protected software code. To
this end, Shapiro criticizes the aftermarket doctrine and the imposition of antitrust
duties on IP with equal vigor. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL VARIAN, INFORMATION
RULES 146-47 (1999).
91. Steven C. Salop, The First Principles Approach to Antitrust, Kodak, and An-
titrust at the Millennium, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 187, 188 (2000) (making this point); see
also Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 63
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not to invent a defense for it that could have negative conse-
quences in other contexts. Second, this defense may stem from a
fear over administerability concerns for courts that must man-
date the licensing of intellectual property. 92 Admittedly, courts
must be careful in this area not to engage in agency-type rate of
return regulation, but the long history of compulsory licensing in
antitrust decrees suggests that this concern is not fatal.93 Fi-
nally, given the joint purposes of intellectual property and anti-
trust, as noted above, it does not make sense to construe
intellectual property laws, such as the one creating the Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals to hear all patent appeals, as limiting
the scope of antitrust liability in the IP area.
94
In short, there is no more warrant for insisting that intellec-
tual property should trump antitrust duties to deal than there is
for demanding complete protection over user and product inter-
faces, lifting all duty to deal requirements imposed by antitrust
for real property, or barring any open access regime under tele-
communications regulation. All of these forms of regulation
must balance the need to protect investment incentives while al-
lowing for the access necessary to facilitate innovation.95 Recog-
nizing the need to harmonize the relevant legal regimes, the
ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 491-92 (1995) ("Ultimately, interbrand competition, contractual
protections, and manufacturing commitments, and the manufacturer's reputation
are likely to be far stronger forces protecting buyers than a legal duty to deal with
its aftermarket rivals.").
92. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 76, at 295; PHILLIP AREEDA & HER-
BERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw (Supplement 2001) at para. 704.1. It should be
noted that the institution of this immunity rule actually creates an administrative
difficulty of its own: courts are forced to evaluate alleged anticompetitive conduct
that naturally implicated the withholding of patented parts without examining ac-
tions regarding the patented parts themselves. See In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust
Litigation, 964 F. Supp. 1479, 1490 (D. Kan. 1997) ("The court's ruling does not pre-
clude a finding of antitrust liability against Xerox based on CSU's other allegations
of exclusionary conduct.").
93. See, e.g., F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 456-57 (2d ed. 1980) ("All in all, the substantial amount of
evidence now available suggests that compulsory patent licensing, judiciously con-
fined to cases in which patent-based monopoly power has been abused ... would
have little or no adverse impact on the rate of technological progress.").
94. For just such an argument, see Michelle M. Burtis & Bruce H. Kobayashi,
Why an Original can be Better than a Copy: Intellectual Property, the Antitrust Re-
fusal to Deal, and ISO Antitrust Litigation, 9 SuP. CT. ECON. REV. 143 (2001).
95. For an example of how commentators attempt to distinguish between these
areas, compare Lemley & McGowan, supra note 80, at 525 ("In network industries,
there is a strong economic argument in favor of permitting reverse engineering in
the limited set of cases in which it promotes either vertical or horizontal compatibil-
ity with an industry standard.") with McGowan, supra note 87, at 525 (opposing
mandatory dealing arrangements under antitrust as inconsistent with intellectual
property statutes and "the rate of return structure they create").
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Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department have emphasized that "[iut is increasingly important
that competition and intellectual property law work in tandem to
support and encourage ongoing innovation" and have scheduled
a set of hearings to develop a harmonious approach to the is-
sue.9 6 Ideally, this effort will help put to rest the argument that
the presence of an intellectual property right can displace the
role of antitrust oversight. As in other areas, antitrust needs to
take account of legitimate pro-competitive restraints-such as
those designed to safeguard against the pirating of intellectual
property-but a categorical rule against antitrust oversight
could give rise to considerable mischief, as firms would seek to
benefit from it by, among other things, trying to cloak anticompe-
titive conduct within the protection of intellectual property.
IV. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PRIVATE ORDERING, AND THE
PROMISE OF THE OPEN SOURCE MOVEMENT
The Internet created a uniquely suitable platform for inno-
vation. In an important sense, the basic standards that consti-
tute the Internet, such as the Internet's transport protocol (e.g.,
TCP/IP) are classic public goods that would have not been pro-
vided by the market itself.9 7 As others have explained, the gov-
ernment's support for the Internet, whose standards were all
open and managed by standard setting committees like the
IETF, constituted a masterful stroke of competition policy.98
Many information platforms built for the Internet, like most In-
ternet browsers and instant messaging systems, were produced
by private companies and protected by intellectual property.
Nonetheless, some "open source" advocates suggest that proprie-
tary development and ownership of software will be a dinosaur
that will not survive the Internet age, rendering worries about
information platform regulation irrelevant. But as outlined be-
low, there are good reasons to believe that proprietary develop-
96. Notice of Public Hearings, Competition and Intellectual Property Law in the
Knowledge-Based Economy, 66 Fed. Reg. 58,146 (2001) (Notice of FTC/DOJ hear-
ings on antitrust and IP policy).
97. See Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects,
J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 102-03 (noting that "a communication network
shares many features with a public good; small users may free-ride on the large
users who may bear the costs necessary to create and market the network"); see also
RiCI-IARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS,
AND CLUB GOODS (2d ed. 1996) (describing the public good concept).
98. See Edward L. Rubin, Computer Languages as Networks and Power Struc-
tures: Governing the Development of XML, 53 SMU L. REV. 1447, 1449-52 (2000)
(describing history of government support for the Internet).
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ment will continue to thrive and must be subject to government
regulation.
During the 1980s, alongside the government's efforts to sup-
port the Internet, Richard Stallman initiated a private sector col-
laborative development project called the GNU project-which
stands for "GNU's Not Unix"-that would create an alternative
operating system to UNIX. 99 To do so, he created the General
Public License (GPL)100 to govern access to the GNU project and
to facilitate the non-proprietary development of software prod-
ucts. In a sense, open source development (or "free software," as
Stallman calls it 1 ) relies on a "virtual firm," uniting a disparate
array of computer programmers in the development and mainte-
nance of a product through online communication and access to
the source code for the software product.
For the true believers, the advent of open source develop-
ment threatens to displace proprietary development and thus
render irrelevant most debates about whether and how intellec-
tual property law governs software. More modestly, some point
to viability of open source as suggestive of the potential for man-
aging a commons of information without the need for proprietary
ownership. In terms of evidence to support either the stronger or
weaker claims regarding open source, consider the success of the
Linux-GNU operating system. This system continues to pick up
market share at the expense of Microsoft's Windows NT, sug-
gesting that the open source phenomenon, while not necessarily
superior to proprietary development, is no fluke.10 2 In terms of
the legal issues regarding the GPL license that governs the use
of the Linux-GNU system, it is somewhat ironic that this effort to
displace traditional proprietary development backed by intellec-
tual property protection itself relies on intellectual property
law-specifically, the rules governing the licensing of
99. For a history of this project, see THE GNU PROJECT, at www.gnu.org.
100. For a description and analysis of the license, see Ira V. Heffan, Note,
Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1487,
1508 (1997) (setting out conditions of GPL).
101. Stallman insists on the term "free software," as opposed to "open source," in
order to underscore the ethical value of non-proprietary development. See Richard
M. Stallman, Why "Free Software" is Better than "Open Source," at http://www.gnu.
org/philosophy/free-software-for-freedom.html (last modified March 9, 2002).
102. See, e.g., Craig Smith, Fearing Control by Microsoft, China Backs the Linux
System, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2000, at Al (noting Linux's popularity); Red Hat Inc.
Amendment No. 5 to Form S-1, 6 (Aug. 11, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1087423/0001047469-99-030827.txt [hereinafter, Red Hat S-1
(Red Hat's acknowledgement, in a securities disclosure, that "[w]e have not demon-
strated the success of our open source business model").
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software.10 3 Putting aside the legal issues, which remain unset-
tled, it is quite clear that the vision embodied in the license offers
an important alternative to proprietary development, both in the
marketplace and as a norm for software development.1
0 4
The essential quality of open source development is that, un-
like proprietary code, all users (and would-be improvers) have
access to the source code itself. Put simply, source code consti-
tutes the human readable version of a program whereas object
code (i.e., machine-readable code) contains the ls and Os that are
actually used by the computer to "execute" the program.10 5 To
translate source code into object code, programmers use compil-
ing software. By distributing the program in a format that users
(and improvers) can examine, open source code allows for others
to correct any errors and identify possible improvements. In so
doing, it provides a model of software development that parallels
an academic, peer review-like model and, not surprisingly, en-
lists considerable support from academics and students.
10 6
The most ambitious form of open source, as enforced by the
GPL, requires all developers using such software to also contrib-
ute any extensions-or, in copyright terms, "derivative works"-
of the standard back to the original licensor.10 7 In this sense, an
open source license of the GPL variety (i.e., one that is "viral")
seeks to ensure, through copyright law itself, a system of private
ordering that provides for continuous open code development.
The significant advantage that open source software enjoys over
proprietary software is that, because the underlying source code
is made public, developers and users working with open source
103. For a discussion of this issue, see Patrick K. Bobko, Linux and General Pub-
lic Licenses: Can Copyright Keep "Open Source" Software Free? 28 AIPLA Q.J. 81
(2000) (arguing that the GPL is enforceable).
104. See David McGowan, Legal Implications of Open Source Software, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 241, 287-302 (examining enforceability and concluding that, regardless
of its legal merit, the licenses should be appreciated for embodying a powerful social
norm).
105. For a discussion of the relevant computer technology, see A. Johnson Laird,
Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 843 (1994).
106. See Marcus Maher, Open Source Software: The Success of an Alternative In-
tellectual Property Incentive Paradigm, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 619, 641-42 (2000). In this respect, the contemporary open source model follows
the development of Unix during the 1970s, which relied greatly on universities for
important feedback. See STEVE LoHR, Go To: THE STORY OF THE MATH MAJORS,
BRIDGE PLAYERS, ENGINEERS, CHESS WIZARDS, MAVERICK SCIENTISTS AND ICONO-
CLASTS, THE PROGRAMMERS WHO CREATED THE SOFTWARE REVOLUTION 78 (2001).
107. For a copy of the GPL, see Free Software Foundation, GNU Public License
(version 1.7, June 1991), available at http://www.fsf.org/licenses/gpl.html. For the
provision addressing "derivative works," see Section 2(b) (providing that licensees
must "cause any work that [they] distribute or publish ... to be licensed as a whole
at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this License.").
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software can evaluate potential changes for themselves and can
fix any bugs in the code itself, thereby leading to a rich positive
feedback effect.108 As Linus Torvalds, the founder of Linux put
it, "[gliven enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow." 10 9
The advent of open source development is a significant de-
velopment and supports the viability of some significant technol-
ogies, but there are important reasons to question whether this
model will emerge as the dominant one for software develop-
ment. As an initial matter, the success of open source develop-
ment depends on some formal or informal consensus, often
coordinated by a champion (and potential funding source), and
that consensus may not always emerge. 110 Where there is such a
champion, as in the cases of the development of the Internet it-
self,]. the World Wide Web, 1 2 and the GNU-Linux operating
system, 1 3 open standards can emerge and sometimes thrive
108. In its S-1 securities filing, Red Hat, a leading distributor of Linux operating
system software explained how this model works:
under the open source software model, software is created through the collab-
orative efforts of large communities of independent developers. Developers
work alone or in groups to write code, make the code available over the in-
ternet, solicit feedback on it from other developers, then modify it and share it
with others for general use. This continuous process results in the rapid
evolution and improvements of open source software.
Red Hat S-1, supra note 102, at 2. Famously, Eric Raymond contrasts the free-
wheeling nature of open source development's repeated beta-testing and multiple
versions (which he likens to a "bazaar") with the tightly controlled method of propri-
etary development (which he compares to a "cathedral"). See ERIC S. RAYMoND, THE
CATHEDRAL & THE BAZAAR, MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL
REVOLUTIONARY 30 (1999). Raymond views this bazaar model as akin to the scien-
tific method, whereby the ultimate product comes with a peer review stamp of ap-
proval. See id. at 38.
109. RAYMOND, supra note 108, at 41 (terming this as "Linus's law"); see also id.
at 62 (noting that Linux uses "the entire world as its talent pool"); id. at 66 ("No
closed source developer can match the pool of talent the Linux community can bring
to bear on a problem."). Carol Rose, noting a similar phenomenon in property the-
ory, terms it "the comedy of the commons." Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Com-
mons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711,
769 (1986).
110. For an argument that open source development can prosper under a purely
decentralized regime, see Christopher Browne, Linux and Decentralized Develop-
ment, available at http://vip.hex.net/-cbbrowne/lsf.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
111. For a brief description of the role played by the National Science Foundation
and the Advanced Research Projects Administration (ARPA), see Rubin, supra note
98, at 1449-52. See also Marcus Maher, An Analysis of Internet Standardization, 3
VA&. J.L. & TECH. 5, 6-7 (1998).
112. Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the basic software for the Web, established
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) to ensure that the basic Web standards
could be maintained as open. See Rubin, supra note 98, at 1452-54 (discussing W3C
and its workings, including the critical role of Berners-Lee, who is its Director).
113. In that case, the critical leadership of Linus Torvalds, the inventor of the
Linux kernel, played-and continued to play-a facilitating role in enabling the sys-
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under the oversight of a respected champion. Without such a
champion, coordinating body, and/or a dedicated source of fund-
ing,114 it may well be the case that open standards will fragment
as different providers of the product "fork" from the original ver-
sion. 115 In particular, the splintering of the Unix operating sys-
tem-which stems from the right of developers to "fork" from
prior versions-is perhaps the classic example of how an open
standard can ultimately fragment into a number of incompatible
operating systems (e.g., HP-UX and Sun's Solaris). 116 By con-
trast, where there are effective persuasive pressures and leader-
ship (as in the case of both Linux and Apache (another open
source product used for web servers), for example), open source
products have maintained a coherent common standard and
have not splintered in the way that UNIX did.11
7
tem to develop. See Raymond, supra note 108, at 89-90, 122-26; Red Hat S-1, supra
note 102, at 6-7 (Red Hat's acknowledgement of the challenges if Torvalds were to
discontinue his role as coordinator of the standard); Interview by Hiroo Yamagata
with Linus Torvalds, The Pragmatist of Free Software: Linus Torvalds Interview, at
http://www.netshooter.com/linux/linus-interview.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2002)
(Torvald's acknowledgement of the importance that "there is one person who every-
body agrees is in charge (me) allows me to do [sic] more radical decisions than most
other projects can allow."); see also Russ Mitchell, Open War, WIRED, October 2001,
at 135, 136, 139 (listing, in addition to Torvalds, the keepers of the kernel). More
recently, in what may become a very significant development, IBM has decided to
support Linux rather than develop an alternative to the existing proprietary ver-
sions of UNIX. See id. at 138-39; see also LoHR, supra note 106, at 215-16. Finally,
the development of a standards-setting body focused primarily on preserving the
compatibility of Linux, the Free Standards Group, should aid its development. See
Stephen Shankland, Standards Help Linux Avoid Unix Fate, CNET NEWS.COM, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1001-950180.htm (Aug. 16, 2002).
114. See McGowan, supra note 104, at 284 (noting how government and univer-
sity support for the Internet and open source projects has been key; thus, "[tihe
viability of large, unsubsidized open-source projects is an open question").
115. The fragmentation issue is one of a number of possible "tragedy of the com-
mons" problems that might befall an open standard not supported through some
institutionalized effort. For the classic explanation of the "tragedy of the commons,"
see Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
116. See Michael J. Schallop, The IPR Paradox: Leveraging Intellectual Property
Rights to Encourage Interoperability in the Network Computing Age, 28 AIPLA Q.J.
195, 263 n.233 (2000); Mitchell, supra note 113, at 138 ("[I]n the past 30 years, Unix
has split into different flavors, most of them closed and proprietary."). In particular,
the so-called "Berkeley UNIX" originated as a single standard, but, after several
"forks" by different sponsors, the standard splintered into different versions. See
MARTIN C. LIBIcKI, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY STANDARDS: QUEST FOR THE COMMON
BYTE 47-56 (1995) (detailing fragmentation of UNIX).
117. LoHR, supra note 106, at 208; see also Eric S. Raymond, Homesteading the
Noosphere: Causes of Conflict, at http://www.tuxedo.orgl-esr/writings/cathedral-ba-
zaar/homesteading/ (last modified Nov. 21, 1998) (highlighting the importance of
leadership to prevent "forking" from a common standard). In a move to prevent a
fragmentation of the Linux standard, Linus Torvalds endorsed the Linux Standards
Base (LSB) project as a means of maintaining a common platform for all Linux
users. See Nicholas Petreley, Linux Road Map Needed, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 24,
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To maintain a coherent standard, some companies have at-
tempted to develop a "quasi-open source" license. Most famously,
Sun's Java technology allows users and developers access to the
source code for a standard that it maintains will provide for a
platform-independent, "write once, run anywhere" environ-
ment.118 Nonetheless, Sun does impose certain restrictions as
part of its "community source license."' 1 9 In particular, Sun has
maintained its trademark over Java, which it uses to ensure that
its licensees maintain the standard, as evidenced by its action
against Microsoft to prevent Microsoft from fragmenting the
Java standard.' 20 Ironically, its decision to retain control over
the standard, even if merely to ensure compatibility and to pre-
vent the fragmentation that plagued Unix, highlights Sun's un-
2001, available at http://www.computerworld.com/storyba/0,4125,NAV47_STO
64104,00.html; see also Free Standards Group, at www.freestandards.org (last vis-
ited Aug. 8, 2002).
118. For an overview of the Java platform, see Java[tm] Technology Overview, at
http://www.sun.com/java/overview.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2002) (explaining sig-
nificance of "write once, run anywhere" slogan). See also Michael P. Doerr, Note,
Java: An Innovation in Software Development and a Dilemma in Copyright Law, 7
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 127, 130-32 (1999) (explaining how the Java Virtual Machine,
which is tailored for each computing environment, can facilitate a platform-indepen-
dent standard and its impact on the software industry).
119. For a discussion of this license, comparing it to open source and other propri-
etary licenses, see Richard P. Gabriel & William N. Joy, Sun Community Source
License Principles, at http://www.sun.com/981208/scsl/principles.html (last visited
Aug. 8, 2002). Over time, Sun eased some of the relevant restrictions, including a
six-digit fee for a commercial source license, and focused primarily on using the li-
censing restrictions to ensure compatibility. See Stig Hackvan, Not Quite Open
Source, But Closer, LINUXWORLD.COM, available at www.linuxworld.com/linuxworld/
lw-1998-12/lw-12-java.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2002). Nonetheless, by keeping
some such restrictions, the Java standard fits within a proprietary code model much
more so than an open source one. See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Could
Java Change Everything? The Competitive Propriety of a Proprietary Standard, 43
ANTITRUST BULL. 715, 753-54 (1998). As such the ISO, an international standards
setting organization, refused to certify Java as a de jure standard. See id. at 755-56.
120. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court decision's initial award of a
preliminary injunction to Sun against Microsoft. See Sun Microsystems, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1126 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (granting preliminary
relief to Sun), rev'd and remanded, 188 F.3d 1115 (1999) (questioning whether com-
patibility requirements were license restrictions or separate covenants). On re-
mand, the district court concluded that the compatibility requirements did not
inhere in the copyright license themselves, see Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1031-32 (N.D. Cal. 2000), but did grant preliminary
relief to Sun on unfair competition grounds, see Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 992, 998-1004 (N.D. Cal. 2000). See also Steven Shankland et
al., Sun, Microsoft Settle Java Suit, CNET NEWS.coM, at http://news.com.com/2100-
1001-251401.html?legacy=cnet (Jan. 23, 2001) (detailing settlement of case). The
issue of whether Microsoft sought to "pollute" Java to protect its position in the oper-
ating systems market emerged as a critical question in the monopolization case
brought by the United States against Microsoft. See United States v. Microsoft, 253
F.3d 34, 74-78 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (discussing issue).
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easiness with making Java a truly open standard. 12 1 Moreover,
Sun's stewardship of Java also retains for itself the right to exert
greater restrictions on its licenses should it choose to do so.
1 2 2
The second critical challenge for open source standards is
that, without a strong champion, it can be extraordinarily diffi-
cult for the standard to evolve. With respect to the modern In-
ternet community (i.e., one that lacks strong government
leadership), the effort to deploy a next generation Internet proto-
col capable of enhanced functionality (IP version 6) continues to
stall, as it is very difficult to coordinate the transition of an open
standard. 123 In significant part, the difficulty in this area stems
from the increasing number of companies now taking part in
open standard setting efforts, resulting in a considerably slower
process.124 By contrast, in markets where more than one net-
work standard battle it out in the marketplace, users can benefit
from a greater degree of dynamism. 2
5
The final challenge for the open source movement is perhaps
the most fundamental: the claim that proprietary ownership is
necessary to provide developers with an incentive to invest time
and money in creating new technologies.' 26 Two examples of this
121. To be fair, Java's license does represent a quasi-open source one in that its
restrictions regarding contributing back fixes to any bugs in Java and its require-
ment that any proprietary extensions have published Application Programming In-
terfaces (APIs) are consistent with the open source model. See Hackvan, supra note
119.
122. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 119, at 751 (expressing concern on this
score). As Lemley and McGowan explain, Sun's statements about keeping their
standard open may give rise to an implied license-or equitable estoppel-defense
should it seek to restrict access to the standard in a fashion to benefit their own
proprietary interests. Id. at 771.
123. See Scott Tyler Shafer, IPv6 Aims to Score the Always-on Goal, RED HER-
RING, Aug. 15, 2001, at 70.
124. See Robert J. Aiken & John S. Cavallini, When are Standards too Much of a
Good Thing? Will they Provide Interoperability for the National Information Infra-
structure, in STANDARDS POLICY FOR INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 253, 259 (Brian
Kahin & Janet Abbate eds., 1995) ("[Tlhe growth of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) has recently strained the capability of its consensus process to resolve
major standards issues in a timely fashion"): Martin Libicki et al., Scaffolding the
New Web: Standards and Standards Policy for the Digital Economy 22 (2000), avail-
able at www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1215 (noting how the theoretical timeta-
ble from draft to standard of 10 months has become 8 years); CARL F. CARGILL, OPEN
SYSTEMS STANDARDIZATION: A BUSINESS APPROACH 57 (1997) (highlighting the diffi-
culty in setting such standards); id. at 77-78 (noting that defining technical stan-
dards can move from a technological activity to a political one).
125. See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28
CONN. L. REV. 1041, 1055 (1996) ("[Clompetition to set the standard for the next
generation of products may still serve a valuable purpose if it drives innovation in
the market.").
126. For a sense of the debate, compare Mathias Strasser, A New Paradigm in
Intellectual Property Law? The Case Against Open Sources, 2001 STAN. TECH. L.
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challenge bear notice. First, the use of open source models that
embrace proprietary extensions-i.e., ones unlike the GPL-sug-
gest concerns about the basic model called for by the GPL license,
which does not allow for any proprietary extensions. In that re-
gard, firms that once embraced open sources as a viable business
model are now having second thoughts and some efforts by com-
mercial firms to use such strategies have failed. 127 Second, re-
flecting the market realities of patenting in the software
industry, most standard setting bodies, including the IETF, have
adopted policies that allow patented technologies to be included
in official standards, provided that they are licensed on reasona-
ble and non-discriminatory terms.
128
In a sign of how the Internet's traditional skepticism to-
wards proprietary development continues to evolve, the current
debates at the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) regarding the
institution of a patent policy highlight how the old model of com-
mitting to royalty free licensing is under tremendous pressure.
129
The W3C, in evaluating an appropriate patent policy, initially
proposed a policy that would permit, but not encourage, the use
of patented technologies in official standards. 130 After an uproar
in the Web community, however, the W3C put forward a revised
proposal that requires all patents that are used in official stan-
REV. 4, 85 ("Stallman's vision suffers from the fact that, as with any communist
ideology, its appeal is likely not to be powerful enough to attract sufficient man-
power to develop enough free software to make it a feasible alternative to proprie-
tary code.") with RAYMOND, supra note 108, at 64, 79-135 (suggesting the prevalence
of a hacker culture that is motivated more by non-monetary rewards, such as the
intrinsic pleasure and reputational benefits from crafting good code).
127. See Stephen Shankland, Open-Source Approach Fades In Tough Times,
CNET NEWS.COM, at http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1003-200-7926260093.html (Nov.
20, 2001) (reporting on failures of firms dedicated to open source); Paul Festa, Will
Real Feast Where Apple Failed?, CNET NEWS.coM, at http://news.com.com/2100-
1023-947094.html (July 30, 2002) (reporting on Apple and Netscape's failed open
source initiatives); see also Stephen Shankland, Unix Pioneer an Open-Source
Killjoy, CNET NEWS.coM, at http://news.com.com/2100-1001-949812.html (Aug. 14,
2002) ("The open source business model hasn't worked very well.") (quoting Bill Joy,
Chief Scientist of Sun Microsystems and Unix pioneer).
128. See Lisa M. Bowman, Industry Group Hones Patent Standards, CNET
NEWS.coM, at http'//news.com.com/2100-1023-948206.html (Aug. 2, 2002) (noting
move to allow patented technologies in official standards).
129. See Wade Roush, Web Tolls Ahead?, INNOVATION 20 (January/February
2002).
130. See Margaret Kane, W3C Publishes Patent Policy, CNET NEws.coM, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-824334.html (Jan. 28, 2002) (detailing proposed pol-
icy); Michael Champion, Patents and Web Standards Town Hall Meeting, XML.coM,
at http://www.xml.com/pub/a/2001/12/19/patents.html (Dec. 19, 2001) (discussing
emergence of issue and likely adoption of policy that would prefer, but not commit
exclusively to, royalty free standards by May 2002).
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dards to be available for royalty free licensing. 131 Even under
this new policy, there are still unanswered questions about how
the W3C could enforce such a policy, leading W3C officials to ac-
knowledge that the organization does not know how it would
deal with exceptional cases where patented technologies were
only available for a fee. 132 This uncertainty underscores both
that proprietary development is an important reality that will
impact the Internet's future development and that standard set-
ting bodies can play an important role in ensuring open stan-
dards and disciplining licensing policies.
The importance of standard setting and the dynamics of net-
work markets are lessons that intellectual property law and anti-
trust law will continue to assimilate in moving towards a
sensible information law regime. One important dimension of
the emerging scholarship in this area-like in the open source
area-is to highlight how the norms of the Internet world, as
sometimes embodied by standard setting bodies, can constrain
private self-interested action by creating an enlightened self-in-
terest ethic that leaves all participants better off. In the stan-
dard setting arena, for example, the insistence on "reasonable
and non-discriminatory" licensing terms for patented technolo-
gies included in a standard ensures that parties are compensated
for their inventions, but are not able to extract extra rents for
their invention by withholding permission to use an individual
component of a larger standard. 133 Legal commentators and
policymakers have only begun to appreciate such points, 3 4 but
given the lack of coherence between the relevant legal regimes
and limited caselaw,135 the legal regulation of standard set-
131. See Margaret Kane, W3C Retreats from Royalty Policy, CNET NEWS.COM, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-845023.html (Feb. 26, 2002).
132. Id. (quoting Daniel J. Weitzner, chair of the patent policy working group at
the W3C).
133. See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Standard Setting in High-Definition Tel-
evision, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1992 at 42
(discussing this practice of the American National Standards Institute).
134. Mark Lemley is the clear leader in this field. See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust
and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041 (1996); Lemley &
McGowan, supra note 80.
135. For some of the leading cases, see Press Release, F.T.C., Dell Computer Set-
tles FTC Charges; Won't Enforce Patent Rights for Widely Used Computer Feature
(Nov. 2, 1995), available at www.ftc.gov/opa/1995/9511dell.htm (describing FTC ac-
tion to prevent Dell from enforcing patent not disclosed during standard setting).
See also Wang Lab., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1578-82 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (patent not disclosed during standard setting gives rise to implied license
under patent law); Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 274
(D. Mass. 1995) (allowing action against standard setting organization to proceed
past summary judgment phase).
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ting remains an under appreciated, important, and murky
topic. 136
Finally, let me note that there may well be a important role
for non-commercial development and preservation of intellectual
property that is distinct from open source development on a com-
mercial basis. First, despite the Bayh-Dole Act's support for uni-
versity patenting and commercialization of inventions, 137 there
is still a strong ethic for university development of ideas that can
be dedicated to the public domain. 138 Second, as Molly van
Houweling explains, there is also a role for non-profit preserva-
tion of inventions in the public domain on a similar model for
what conservationists have used for real property-i.e., the de-
velopment of a land trust-type model. 139
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE INFORMATION AGE
The information age presents a number of puzzles for First
Amendment law. Most basically, there are two sides of the First
Amendment information law coin, each of which suggest a differ-
ent role for government regulation of information platforms. On
one side, the First Amendment supports the development of mea-
sures, such as the imposition of access obligations on communica-
tion companies, to ensure "the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources. 1 4° On the
other side, the First Amendment calls for constitutional scrutiny
of such regulations, making it the "preferred constitutional as-
sault vehicle for... challenging government regulation."' 4 ' The
future of information platform regulation will ultimately need to
harmonize these two roles. In a very preliminary attempt to do
so, I will outline how the First Amendment can work both as a
constitutional norm that calls for supporting public access to the
136. See Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Standard Setting
Organizations (April 2002) (available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stractid=310122).
137. Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-28 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§200-12 (1994)).
138. For a sense of the debate on the impact of patenting on scientific and univer-
sity-based research, compare Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Rights
and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 77 (1999)
with F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and
the Norms of Science-A Reply to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 691 (2001).
139. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Cultivating Open Information Platforms:
A Land Trust Model, 1 J. TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L. 309 (2002).
140. United States v. Associated Press, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (emphasizing First Amendment com-
mitment to public debate that should be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open").
141. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 1370.
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media as well as a check on the imposition of unreasonable ac-
cess obligations.
A. The First Amendment as a Constitutional Norm
A major thrust of telecommunications policy, alongside of
competition policy and consumer protection, is to ensure that cit-
izens benefit from a healthy marketplace of ideas. As such, the
FCC's enabling legislation as well as its regulations continue to
address the value of preserving a diversity of voices in the mar-
ketplace of ideas. Nonetheless, the FCC's efforts over the years
to foster a diverse marketplace of ideas-from the Fairness Doc-
trine's insistence on rights of reply on broadcast television to cre-
ating public, educational, and governmental cable channels-
have not exactly been thriving success stories.
The First Amendment envisions a robust marketplace of
ideas, but as the Supreme Court held in the Tornillo case, it does
not provide would-be speakers with any guarantees of access.
142
One explanation for the one way ratchet of First Amendment en-
forcement-for rights of information providers, but not for rights
of receivers to talk back-is to view the need for affirmative ac-
cess obligations as "underenforced" constitutional norms-i.e.,
those enforced by branches of the government other than the fed-
eral judiciary. 143 A salutary benefit of this perspective is that it
underscores the benefits of subsidizing speaking opportunities
and opportunities for public debate directly rather than relying
on private parties to act according to government regulation, and
against their own interest, to provide such opportunities. Put
simply, PBS is in, the Fairness Doctrine is out.1
4 4
By appreciating the government's responsibility to facilitate
democratic participation, policymakers may begin to take a
broader look at the tools available to realize the First Amend-
ment's aspiration for robust public debate. Among other things,
we might begin to shift our focus from mandating that cable com-
panies devote valuable spectrum for public access channels to in-
stead shifting the value of the spectrum to support Internet-
centered efforts that would create much richer opportunities for
142. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
143. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1212 (1978); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in
Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
410 (1993).
144. For such an argument, see Henry Geller, Public Interest Regulation in the
Digital TV Era, 16 CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 341, 362-66 (1998).
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public debate. 145 The goal of such efforts, as Yochai Benkler has
eloquently explained, would be to empower consumers to become
users of media technology and producers of information. 146 In so
doing, the government would reinforce an amazing part of the
Internet: its nature as a many-to-many medium that enables
millions of individuals to become publishers.147 Moreover, as El-
len Goodman explains, a communications policy based on subsi-
dizing certain forms of speech through access to spectrum or
conditioned benefits can move away from relying on "scarcity" to
justify efforts to ensure a diverse marketplace of ideas and pave
the way for a more sensible First Amendment doctrine.
148
B. The First Amendment as a Constraint on Regulation
In evaluating how the government can regulate information
platforms either through conferring intellectual property rights
or mandating access, the First Amendment will be an area where
the courts will need to develop a sensible framework for allowing
sufficient leeway for sound regulation while at the same time
safeguarding the public interest. Thus, it should not be a sur-
prise that the debate over the role of First Amendment in the
digital age will often pit claims of the need to scrutinize interest-
group legislation that is designed to preserve the status quo and/
or address phantom competitive concerns against a concern that
an overly intrusive standard would create a form of a First
Amendment Lochnerism.
149
On the interest group regulation point, it is clear that some
accountability for the validity of restrictions on the use of infor-
145. See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace 2.0+, 79 TEx. L. REV. 447, 471-
75 (2000) (reviewing ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION (1999)) (dis-
cussing Andrew Shapiro's conception of a "PublicNet").
146. See Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Struc-
tures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM.
L.J. 561, 562 (2000) (making this point).
147. See Kevin Kelly, The Web Runs on Love, Not Greed, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3,
2002, at A8 (noting that 70% of the 3 billion web pages are built by individuals for
the desire to share ideas, not to make money).
148. See Goodman, supra note 40; see also Weiser, supra note 41, at 13-15 (calling
for a shift in First Amendment doctrine away from the Red Lion regime).
149. Compare Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32, 65 (D.D.C. 1993)
(Williams, J.) (without a clear showing of the need for regulation, "the door is open-
even in the area of First Amendment rights-to exercise of the most naked interest-
group preferences"), with Respondents' Oral Argument, 1995 WL 733396, at 34-35
(Dec. 6, 1995), United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 516 U.S. 415 (1996)
(Justice Breyer's comparison of greater First Amendment scrutiny to "Lochnerism"),
and United States et al. v. United Foods, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 2334, 2348 (2001) ("I do not
believe the First Amendment seeks to limit the Government's economic regulatory
choices ... any more than does the Due Process Clause.") (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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mation platforms can increase the quality of lawmaking and reg-
ulation. With regard to the limitations on telephone company
provision of video services, for example, the line of business re-
strictions in place before the Telecom Act rested on little or no
reasoned basis. Not surprisingly, every court to consider the is-
sue concluded that these regulations could not pass First Amend-
ment muster before the Telecom Act rendered the issue moot.'
50
By insisting on an intermediate standard of review in the Turner
case, the Supreme Court sought to encourage such careful re-
views, but also to ensure that Congress, state agencies, and the
FCC enjoyed discretion in implementing economic regulation
that governs the information industries. 151
Recent events confirm that firms in the information indus-
tries will eagerly invoke First Amendment arguments to chal-
lenge governmental regulation and that courts may be too
willing to second guess reasonable public policies. With respect
to the open access regulation of cable modems in Broward
County, Florida, for example, one court invalidated such regula-
tions on First Amendment grounds because they were "adopted
at the behest of a telephone company seeking to eliminate or
hamper a competitor."1 52 To be sure, many telephone companies
have championed open access as a means of obtaining "regula-
tory parity" with cable broadband providers, but this fact alone
should not suggest that such regulations are impermissible on
First Amendment grounds. Rather, as the Fourth Circuit sensi-
bly held in Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Ass'n v.
FCC, a regime premised on ensuring regulatory parity is a legiti-
mate policy concern. 15 3 Nonetheless, in the face of rulings like
that from the Broward County case as well as lingering questions
about what level of detail must be developed to justify prophylac-
tic regulation on information platforms, 54 it seems likely that
150. See Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir.
1994), cert. granted, 515 U.S. 1157 (1995), judgment vacated as moot, 516 U.S. 415
(1996); US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1995); S. New England
Tel. Co. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 211 (D. Conn. 1995); NYNEX Corp. v. United
States, Civil No. 93-323-C, 1994 WL 779761 (D. Me. 1994); Bellsouth Corp. v. United
States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F.
Supp. 721 (N.D. Il. 1994).
151. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
152. Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, Florida,
124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 696 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
153. See Satellite Broad. and Communications Ass'n v. FCC, 275 F.3d 337 (4th.
Cir. 2001); see also H.R. Rep. No. 106-79, pt. 1, at 11 (1999) (legislative history high-
lighting concerns with regulatory parity); Goodman, supra note 43, at 264-65 (ex-
plaining how SHVIA took account of regulatory parity concerns).
154. See Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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such litigation will be a growth industry among lawyers and will
become a growing concern among policymakers.
CONCLUSION
The regulatory regime for information platforms is only be-
ginning to take shape. In this emerging legal environment,
somewhat like that presented by the advent of the progressive
era of regulatory statutes during the early part of the 1900s,
policymakers and commentators are going to continue to debate
the virtues and pitfalls of different forms of regulation-statu-
tory, common law-like, agency-generated rulemakings, self-regu-
lation by standard setting bodies, or private ordering by contract.
Where courts must act-say, in the First Amendment area-
they are often humbled by the concern that overreaching for cat-
egorical rules will backfire as technology and the market quickly
overruns even today's sensible rules. 155 Eventually, policymak-
ers will settle on a more stable regime for information law, but
not before a period of "muddling through."
The effort to harmonize the goals of the relevant legal
tools-starting with the basic rights and control provided by the
intellectual property laws, as limited by telecommunications reg-
ulation and antitrust-presents commentators, lawyers, and
judges with a very formidable challenge. 15 6 Happily, the papers
and participation at this conference suggest a strong set of voices
and appetite for tackling the difficult issues ahead. I look for-
ward to more discussions of these issues in the Journal of Tele-
communications and High Tech Law in the years to come, which
I hope will inspire future lawyers and technologists to enter the
field with new passion and perspective.
155. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S.
727, 778 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (in the dynamic world of telecommunica-
tions, judges should "'[f]irst, do no harm"' (quoting the Hippocratic Oath));
Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, 202 F.3d 573, 584 n.11 (2d Cir. 2000) (tak-
ing an "evolutionary" approach that favors "narrow" holdings that allow for "case-
by-case" adjudication).
156. Phil Weiser, Paradigm Changes in Telecommunications Regulation, 71 U.
COL. L. REV. 819, 847 (2000).
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